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The paper hypothesizes that the level of aggregate human capital in 
an economy affects the overall returns of an individual's human 
capital accumulation and fertility decision. However, the positive 
externalities from aggregate human capital are not internalized by 
households in their investment decisions. Using an overlapping-
generations model, specify the household’s optimization problem in a 
rural developing country where parents have an old-age support 
motive that underlies the benefits of having and educating children. 
The optimal decision of parents is then contrasted with that of the 
social planner. They differ in that the social planner internalizes the 
externalities of aggregate human capital on the single consumption 
good production. The difference between investment decisions yields 
the country’s optimal education subsidy. The model is tested 
empirically on secondary education across 59 countries using 
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1 Introduction  
 Human capital plays a central role in shaping the growth of economies and is a crucial 
determinant of a person’s and a nation’s productivity. Öztürk (2001) even labeled the 20th 
century as the “Age of Human Capital” since a country’s standard of living now is primarily 
determined by how well it succeeds in developing the skills, utilizing the knowledge, and 
furthering the health and education of its citizens. For developing countries, the most prevalent 
method of accumulating human capital is education. As the benefits of education are manifold 
and unquantifiable, including promoting competitiveness, slowing down birth rates, and 
increasing per capita income growth, it is evident that there are positive externalities to 
increasing aggregate human capital. This is proven by the prioritizing of education investment 
initiatives by all parties involved, from the Millennium Development Goal’s target for universal 
primary education to localized plans from governments like Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020) in 
Malaysia. The eagerness to speed up the original rate of education investment clearly shows an 
implicit understanding that, if left to their own accord, the citizens of these countries lack the 
incentive to invest in human capital at the rate the local government or international aid and 
development agencies would consider ideal. However, faced with the small budgets that 
developing countries are usually working with, what should the subsidy look like? How much is 
necessary to generate the results that they want to see?  
 The purpose of my paper is twofold. First, it is to present a costs and benefits analysis 
that is modeled after a rural developing economy. This analysis applies to two parties: the 
average household in the economy and a hypothetical social planner who is omnipotent. Since 
the households do not internalize the positive externalities of aggregate human capital, their 
choices of investment in the human capital of their children and the number of children to have 
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will be suboptimal. The social planner, however, will see all the effects of human capital and 
fertility decisions in the economy and take them into account. Comparing both decisions, an 
optimal education subsidy can be developed. Internalizing this policy instrument, I analyze the 
change in parameter relationships as the model economy funds the subsidy with a payroll tax. 
Furthermore, I test the general implications of the model empirically across 59 countries for real 
world significance using difference-in-difference analysis and OLS regressions.  
 The literature on human capital, fertility, and growth is substantial. In models of 
endogenous growth, Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) as well as Galor and Weil (2000) 
frame fertility decisions based on the quantity-quality tradeoff between the number of children 
and the education of each child. They assume increasing returns to human capital in their model, 
indicating its positive externality. Morand (1999) presents a similar growth model with an old-
age support motive that is more reflective of rural developing economies. Positive externalities 
relating to education is also a subject that has been widely studied (Moretti, 2004; Mueller, 2007; 
Hall, 2006), although there is still no consensus on its quantification.  I have not found 
treatments of optimal subsidies for education in the economic growth literature. However, the 
framework that Goodfriend and King (2001), as well as Khan, King, and Wolman (2000) created 
for determining optimal monetary tax policies provides good analogs.  
 The contributions of this work will be to create a theoretical growth model with the same 
quantity-quality tradeoff between the number of children and the education of each child that is 
representative of a rural developing economy. This means that the model will incorporate the 
old-age support motive and imperfect credit markets. This model will then be solved from the 
household’s and then the social planner’s perspective, since the household does not take into 
account the effect of its decisions on the aggregate stock of human capital. Becker, Murphy, and 
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Tamura (1990) have a solid theoretical framework that has influenced much of this model. 
However, in their models they assumed that households internalize the human capital externality 
and that parents possess an altruistic utility function. This may not be the case with developing 
countries where the old-age support motive is prevalent. Morand starts out with a rural 
developing economy in mind but did not take into account the fact that households do not 
internalize the externality. Moreover, he also assumes that parent’s education levels only affect 
their investment in children positively. They do not take into account the opportunity cost of 
raising children; the opportunity cost is related to market wages and increases with human 
capital. The externality papers focused more on testing for the existence of externalities, and the 
concentration is on tertiary education. Since this paper is modeling a rural developing economy, 
my work deals with lower levels of education rather than tertiary education. This is because 
education is cumulative and developing countries, often faced with low enrollment numbers at 
the primary and secondary levels, have to focus on increasing these enrollment rates before 
moving on to tertiary education. The optimum subsidy measure shows a basic framework of the 
relationships between different factors in the economy. If developed further, it can be used to 
examine the effectiveness of education initiatives in different countries.  
 The suboptimization of the household is confirmed by the proving of a lower steady state 
human capital investment level and a higher steady state fertility level compared to the social 
planner’s levels. The optimal subsidy confirms original intuition in terms of its relationships with 
different parameters in the model. The incorporation of a payroll tax changes some of the 
dynamics within the first optimal subsidy specification compared to the second. This is due to 
the way the tax is structured. On the empirical side, the difference-in-differences analysis shows 
an effective education policy change between the lower income groups and the high income 
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group. The regression results confirm most intuitions but also highlighted some problems with 
some of the selected proxies, especially the proxy for the secondary education subsidy.  This will 
be discussed further in the paper.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical model and describes 
the decisions of the household and the social planner, establishing the need for an education 
subsidy. Section 3 follows with the incorporation of the policy instrument into the theoretical 
economy. The general validity of this model will then be tested in Section 4 empirically and 
Section 5 will be the conclusion.   
 
2 The Model 
2.1 The Decentralized Economy 
 The model employs the overlapping-generations framework to construct the individual 
household’s consumption decision. Individuals live for three periods in this model but are 
productive in only one. In the first period, they are born and will make no choices because they 
consume a portion of their parents’ production. This model presupposes that the only costs 
associated with having or educating offspring are production goods1. In a sense, parents will pay 
to have children and to give them human capital. In the second period, individuals become 
productive and supply one unit of labor inelastically. They pay out a portion of their wage to 
their parents, invest in their offspring and their offspring’s education, and spend the rest on their 
own consumption. In the third period, individuals make no decisions but are assumed to consume 
a portion of all their children’s’ wages. These individuals are supported by their children and this 
support system is assumed to continue from generation to generation, reflective of the old-age 
                                                
1 Some papers use time as an input to having children, like Becker, Tamura and Murphy (1990). 
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support motive prevalent in many developing countries2.  Developing economies typically have 
imperfect credit markets and so it is assumed that there is no way of transferring income from 
one period to the next via financial transactions. There are no savings and all goods are 
perishable by the end of each period. Children and their education will be the only investment 
transferable from period to period. It is assumed that there is no heterogeneity amongst the 
households in the economy. The model uses households as a production unit3.  
 In period t, the household is productive and receives the marginal product of their labor 
as wage, . A traditional, exogenous, and fixed fraction, , from one’s wage, is given to parents 
as old-age support4. The portion of the income allocated to raising children is .  is 
the fixed cost of having a child, which includes food, clothing and other basic expenses (0 <  < 
1).  is the parents’ human capital determined from the period before which translates into the 
opportunity cost of having children with returns (0 <  < 1). As the parents’ wages increase as 
a function of their education, it will be costlier to have children since they will be taking time 
away from earning more money. The per unit cost of education is , a positive parameter (0 <  
< 1). Lastly,  is the education level of each child which translates directly into its cost, and  
is the number of children. The household’s consumption function at period t is: 
   (1) 
                                                
2 This support system can be attributed to the cultural norm and also to the lack of a social security system or 
pension fund plan, both of which are reflective of rural developing economies. 
3 It is acknowledged that there is a discrepancy between households in the first period having children, and the 
children individually becoming households in the second period and having children on their own. However, the 
complex modeling of this discrepancy is not pursued in this paper.  
4 Leibenstein (1975) outlines the argument that the decision to have children is based on the old-age support motive 
as part of an informal trading system. There is other evidence that support the individual family as the dominant 
institution of old-age support in developing countries (Jiang, 1994; Jensen, 1990; Dharmalingam, 1994). Nugent 
(1985) presents a helpful and objective oversight on the importance of this motive as part of endogenous growth 
models. 
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Because  must be non-negative, the constraint  must hold.  
 In the period t+1, the individual is no longer working and will be consuming the fixed 
share from the total of their children’s wages. 
   (2) 
 The optimization problem the household is facing is then to choose between number of 
children to have,  and the human capital investment for each child, , in order to maximize 
utility from their consumption both when productive and during retirement. With β being the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, the household optimization problem to be solved, subject 
to the budget constraints above, is 
   (3) 
 The economy’s production function will include only human capital as an input. The 
reason for this is firstly for simplicity and secondly because all physical capital is in some shape 
or form created, designed, and operated by human capital. In that sense it is encompassed in this 
model. Output is thus given by, 
   (4) 
is the aggregate level of human capital embedded in current productive members of 
workforce,  is the individual’s human capital, and  is the size of the productive 
population. The individual human capital term is lagged by one period because the education 
process takes place one period earlier for all working individuals. The return to individual human 
capital, γ is a positive fraction (0 < γ < 1). This includes exogenous factors like land. The return 
to the aggregate effects of human capital is , a positive fraction. The aggregate level of human 
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capital, ,  is the product of each individual’s human capital, multiplied by the number of 
children raised last period as well as all the number of identical households who raised and 
educated these children in the previous period, . 
 Assuming the labor market is in equilibrium and the wage is the marginal product of 
labor, 
   (5) 
For simplicity, I use log functions for the consumption utilities. 
   
Using (1) and (2), the first order condition for the optimal human capital investment is, 
    
After reworking the equation, 
   (6) 
Taking the derivative of  with respect to ,  
   
There is a definite negative relationship between human capital accumulation and fertility. 
Unsurprisingly, the cost of education, , also affects human capital accumulation negatively. A 
higher cost of education leads to lower investment in education of offspring. The increase of the 
allocation to the productive household’s parents, , will decrease human capital accumulation 
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because it decreases the overall portion of income leftover for educating and rearing their own 
children. As well, the higher the human capital of the parents, , the more costly is rearing 
children.  
The first order condition for the fertility decision is, 
    
Reworking the equation, 
   (7) 
The derivative with respect to  from this first order condition is, 
   
This also confirms the inverse relationship between fertility and human capital accumulation. 
The cost of having children, , the opportunity cost of the parents, , and the fraction paid out 
to the retired grandparents, , all have a negative correlation with fertility. Combining (6) and 
(7) to get optimal choices for both fertility and human capital accumulation, 
   (8) 
 The optimal fertility decision for households, , confirms the initial intuition. The higher 
the cost of rearing children, the lower the number of children the parents will choose. As well, an 
increase in the opportunity cost of parent’s time will also lower optimal fertility. As the returns 
to individual human capital, , increases this means that human capital investment will be 
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favored and so optimal fertility will drop. Lastly, the fraction paid out to retired parents has an 
inverse relationship with the household’s fertility decision since it decreases overall household 
income. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution has a more ambiguous effect on the optimal 
fertility decision.  
   (9) 
 The optimal human capital accumulation above, , depends positively on the cost of 
having children and negatively on the cost of education. An increase in cost of having children 
will mean that parents will substitute having more children for educating the children further. 
The optimal human capital investment is also positively related to the parents’ education. 
Because higher parental human capital translates into higher opportunity costs for having 
children, highly educated parents will invest in the quality of children rather than quantity. 
 From (9), it is possible to find the steady state for human capital accumulation, h*i. By 
equating , 
   (10) 
This steady state shows that the economy converges towards a certain value of human capital. To 
find the steady state for fertility, is substituted into (8), 
   (11) 
Increasing levels of human capital over time would need the following, 
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 This shows the ceiling level of human capital the parents need to have in order to educate 
their offspring more than themselves. When the cost of having children, , is very low, this 
means a low threshold level of  and a low ceiling for human capital accumulation. This 
means that it will be hard to accumulate human capital which confirms the substitution effect 
towards increased fertility. When the cost of education, , is low, this means that the ceiling is 
high and so there will be more human capital accumulation.  
 
2.2 Social Planner 
 The social planner makes decisions based on all households across all periods. The 
planner also internalizes the complementarities in aggregate human capital, which the household 
does not see. A cross section of what the planner will be maximizing will be, 
   
Because the planner recognizes the role of aggregate human capital in wages, 
is substituted in, 
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After solving the first order condition for fertility at period t,  
   (12) 
 As can be seen above, fertility here still depends on the same things as equation (7) 
except for the added  term, the parameter associated with the aggregate human capital 
specification. In fact, if the parameter  is zero, taking out the aggregate human capital’s effect 
on the social planner’s decision, equation (11) becomes the solution to the household’s first order 
condition for fertility, equation (7). The first order condition for human capital at period t, is 
more difficult to solve cleanly. After substituting in equation (11), the simplest form that I can 
reduce it to is, 
    
 Since it is not possible to solve it without specifying some of the parameters, I decided to 
move straight to finding the steady state for human capital from the social planner’s perspective. 
When , 
   (13) 
From this, it is also possible to see how the pre-existing relationships from the human capital 
steady state from the household’s perspective carried over. The negative relationship with the 
cost of education and the positive relationship with the cost of having children still hold. For this 
steady state to be positive and not infinity, the returns to education, , has to obey the 
inequality,  
   (14) 
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 To determine whether households suboptimize in their investment decisions, the steady 
state human capital from the social planner’s standpoint, , has to be larger than the steady 
state human capital from the household’s standpoint . This then makes the case for an 
education subsidy. Confirming the suboptimization, as seen later, will require actually estimating 
some of the parameters. A simple comparison, however, can be made by taking away effects in 
 that are not found in the household steady state. Since the social planner’s steady state 
human capital contains the parameter behind the opportunity cost of having children, , and the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution,  , it means that more than the positive externalities 
from aggregate human capital, ,  is effecting the social planner’s decision. To prove this, the 
returns to aggregate human capital effect is removed, i.e. ,   
   (15) 
 The presence of the opportunity cost term, , shows that the social planner is also taking 
into account the fertility cost increase imposed by the parents on their children for raising their 
grandchildren in the next generation. The human capital bought for each child translates into an 
opportunity cost for them in having children the next period. However, parents who are investing 
in human capital for their children are only concerned with maximizing the utility of their 
consumption during their retirement. The parents are not taking into account the fertility cost 
they will impose on their children during their children’s productive period. This cost will cause 
the parents to choose a higher human capital investment rate. The assumption of this inequality 
will mean that from the social planner’s perspective, households are under-investing in their 
children’s human capital rather than over-investing. If this effect is also removed, i.e. , 
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   (16) 
From this, the similarity with equation (10), the household’s steady state human capital can be 
seen. After comparing equation (16) to equation (10), it is evident that without the aggregate 
effects of complementarities in human capital or the incurred cost on the grandchildren’s 
generation, the social planner’s steady state is still higher than the household’s, as seen below, 
   
Moving to the steady state fertility decision from the social planner’s standpoint, 
 
The basic relationships here hold. There is a negative relationship with the cost of fertility but a 
positive relationship with rising education cost. The aggregate and opportunity cost effects are 
harder to determine just by looking at the equation. However, taking these effects out, it is 
extremely close in form to (11),  
   
  
Since all the equations here are relatively complex, further work on the parametric relationships 
within them and comparisons between them will require specifying the parameter values. Table 1 
shows the parameters and their estimated values. 
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Parameter Description Value Note 




Effect of total education on real GDP 
output in 1980 (Lau, Jamison and Louat, 
1991) 
 Cost of education 0.05 Completed secondary education of low and 
low middle income countries in 1980 as 
proxy (Barro and Lee, 2000) 
 Cost of parental support 0.04 Ratio of population over 65 over total 
population of low and low middle income 
countries in 1980 as proxy (Health, 
Nutrition and Population Database) 
 Inter-temporal elasticity 
of substitution 
0.03 Average annual estimate, 0.9 taken to the 
30th power to represent the span of a 
generation.  
 Returns to opportunity 
cost of fertility  
0.01 Assumed value relative to  to ensure 
continual investment in education 
 Cost of childcare 0.1 Assumed value relative to  in that 
childcare is a more consistent cost 
 Returns to aggregate 
human capital 
0.01 Assumed value relative to  in that there 
are more individual returns to human 
capital compared to the aggregate 
Table 1 Parameter estimates 
 
If is to be larger than , the following inequality will have to apply, 
   
 This inequality’s feasibility can be tested in Mathematica by varying two parameters at a 
time, holding the others at their estimated values. Mathematica generates plots that are shaded 
for the regions where the inequality holds across the range of both parameters. This inequality 
holds for most of the parameters when they are varied from zero to one5. An example is Figure 1 
below, where the inequality holds for the entire ranges of both parameters and . The initial 
                                                
5 The parameters are varied only from zero to one because they are positive fraction as discussed earlier. 
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estimated values from Table 1 for and are shown in the plot. This shows the wide range of 
values for and where the inequality will still apply.   
               
 Figure 1 Social planner’s higher steady state (SS) HC: Inequality feasibility plot for δ versus ε 
 
Figure 2 shows the feasibility plot for individual and aggregate human capital returns. From the 
inequality in (14),  should be less than 0.5. As can be seen, the inequality applies for the entire 
range of both parameters. Again, the initial estimated values for both parameters are shown. The 
last plot is included in the appendix. These plots confirm that households invest less in human 
capital compared to the social planner at steady state. 
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  Figure 2 Social planner’s higher SS HC: Inequality feasibility plot for δ versus γ  
 
 As it has been established that there is a need for an education subsidy due to suboptimal 
investments from the part of the household, it should also be shown that they are having more 
children than what the social planner would prefer. If is to be smaller than , the 
following inequality will have to apply, 
 
 
 Using estimated parameters, the same inequality plotting can be done with Mathematica. 
The majority of shaded areas confirm that the households are over-investing in fertility compared 
to the social planner’s perspective. Again, the estimated values for from Table 1 for both varied 
parameters are shown below in each plot. The other feasibility plots are included in the appendix. 
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 Figure 3 Social Planner’s lower SS Fertility: Inequality feasibility plot for γ versus ε 
   
   
  Figure 4 Social Planner’s lower SS Fertility: Inequality feasibility plot for δ versus ε 
 
 Since the majority of the regions in the plots above are shaded, the suboptimality of the 
households’ investment decisions in children can be established6. As a result, a policy measure to 
                                                
6 The further prove this, the steady states for fertility and human capital for both household and social planner are 
plotted on graphs with the estimated parameter values. These graphs are included in the appendix. 
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close these gaps can be introduced, be it a subsidy on human capital investment or tax on 
fertility. In this paper, I choose to look at an education subsidy instead of a fertility tax because 
education subsidies are the most popular policy instrument used by governments to increase 
human capital investments and subsequently reduce fertility. There are a number of countries 
like China and Singapore who have taxed having children in order to lower fertility rates, but 
these policies are not that common and it can be assumed to be a permanent positive shock to 
fertility cost in the model. 
 To calculate how much of a subsidy would be necessary, the cost of education, , for the 
household is broken up into the actual cost of education and a subsidy, . Since the 
household is investing less than the desired amount, the cost of education for them should be 
higher than what it actually is with the complementarities internalized. The subsidy will lower 
that cost. The planner’s level of investment will just be the actual cost of education. Equating 
both the steady states from the household and the social planner, the optimal subsidy is as 
follows, 
    (17) 
For the subsidy to not be negative or infinity,  
   (18) 
The positive fraction  has to obey inequality (14). After substituting (14) into (18), the 
inequality is now   
   
Since parameters , , and are all positive fractions , the left hand side of the inequality will 
always be smaller than the right hand side. This confirms that the subsidy does not go to infinity.  
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 As can be seen from equation (17), there is a positive relationship between the amount of 
subsidy and the education cost. As education cost increases, so will the subsidy. This can be 
shown by differentiating  with respects to and getting a positive result.  
   
By contour plotting the effect of on  in Mathematica, the positive relationship can be 
confirmed. 
   
Figure 5 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus aggregate returns τ 
  
 The rest of the parameter relationship within the optimal subsidy condition is less 
obvious at first glance and so they are plotted using Mathematica with the earlier estimates. 
Below is the relationship between the aggregate human capital effects and the subsidy, 
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Figure 6 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus aggregate returns δ  
 
As the positive externalities from human capital increases, so will the optimal education subsidy. 
This confirms the initial intuition of the social planner taking into account the positive 
externalities of education on society and thereby encouraging households to invest in more 
human capital by increasing education subsidy. However, it is not a linearly increasing 
relationship. The subsidy increases at a much slower rate at higher levels of aggregate returns 
compared to lower levels. This convergence confirms the theory of a steady state that countries 
will move towards.  
 Figure 7 shows the relationship between the power of opportunity cost of having children 
and subsidy. The negative relationship between the power of fertility’s opportunity cost and 
subsidy is clearly shown here. 
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Figure 7 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus power of opportunity cost of fertility ε 
 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the returns to individual human capital and subsidy. 
   
 Figure 8 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus individual human capital return γ 
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When the individual human capital returns are extremely low, subsidy decreases initially. This 
means that at very low values of individual returns, there are not enough positive returns for 
more education subsidies to be implemented in the economy. However, the subsidy starts to 
increase exponentially after the value of about 0.06, indicating that the positive effect of the 
individual human capital returns dominates after that. 
 The optimal subsidy condition here is introduced as an exogenous variable into the 
model. This is not unrealistic in that foreign aid to a country targeted at encouraging its 
education investment will have a similar effect on the decisions of its households. Taking it a 
step further, though, the next section explores the model when the economy has to finance this 
subsidy on its own. 
 
3 Domestic Policy Implications 
3.1 The Decentralized Economy 
 Now that households have been shown to have suboptimal levels of investments and an 
optimal subsidy has been established, it is important to document how this policy instrument can 
be internalized to help channel the households towards the ideal level of investment. Since 
government expenditure has to equal government revenue, subsidies given out to households has 
to be financed by the same amount in taxes. The tax will take the form of a payroll tax and will 
only affect the productive population at each period since they will be the ones earning wages 
and acting on the subsidy.  
 Payroll tax takes a portion out of the productive individuals’ incomes. This decreases 
their spending capacity for everything else. However, the education subsidy returns this amount 
to the household, specifically as a discount in education cost. Since the households are not 
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involved in the tax policy decisions, they take the tax levy, T, and the education subsidy value, s, 
as exogenous. The new budget constraint at period t will look as follows, 
    (17) 
The payroll tax that is paid, T, is a positive fraction that gets taken out of the household’s wage. 
The cost of education, , still remains but added on now is, s, the education subsidy.  
In the retired period, the constraint is 
    (18) 
 The first order condition for fertility solved for  is 
    
This is very similar to the first order condition for the household before the policy implications 
and the same relationships within the parameters still apply.  
 The first order condition for human capital solved for  is 
    
Having equated both solved first order conditions, the optimal conditions are, 
    (19) 
    (20) 
The relationships within the optimal conditions with payroll tax are exactly the same as before 
without the addition of the subsidy. With the optimal condition for , the subsidy has a positive 
relationship.  
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 The resultant steady state will be, 
   (21) 
Everything is the same except for the addition of the subsidy term which will have a positive 
impact on the steady state of human capital accumulation. 
The steady state for fertility with the payroll tax is 
   (22) 
As can be seen, the added subsidy term has a negative impact on steady state fertility of the 
household with a payroll tax. The subsidy will motivate more investment in human capital versus 
fertility. Since the payroll tax is exogenous, the household has to take it as given, pay it, and 
work with whatever income is leftover after tax. Since they construct their decisions post-tax, the 
tax term T is not included in both steady states.   
 
3.2 The Social Planner 
 For the social planner, the payroll tax is internalized. Since government spending has to 
equal government revenue, the amount taxed has to equal to the amount received.  
    (23) 
The productive population in the economy will be taxed to finance this subsidy because they are 
earning the wages. The total payroll tax incurred on all productive citizens is the product of the 
value of the tax, a positive fraction, the wages of individuals, and the number of productive 
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individuals born the period before, . This amount translates into the subsidy, s, for the 
human capital of each child, , of all the households, . 
 Since the social planner internalizes this tax, the consumption pattern across time now 
looks slightly different, 
 
 Say at period t, the optimal consumption function of the retired population is  and 
 is the function for the productive population, 
   (24) 
   (25) 
The optimal levels of human capital and fertility investments for the households are then 
substituted into  and  and the social planner’s optimization problem across periods is 
solved by maximizing utility with respect to the subsidy 7. 
   
The resultant nonlinear equation is as below,  
                                                
7 Much appreciation goes to Professor Barbara Craig for teaching me this method.  
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 As mentioned before, the social planner in this economy is taking into account two 
different externalities. The first one is the positive externality that aggregate human capital 
brings and the second is the added cost that parents imposes on their children in the form of the 
opportunity cost of more education on fertility. By giving their children human capital in the 
form of education, parents raise the fertility cost for their children. Since my paper is primarily 
concerned with the externality from aggregate human capital, I simplify the nonlinear equation 
above by leaving out the opportunity cost of education effect. With , the resultant closed-
form solution is as follows,  
  (26)  
  
The optimal subsidy from the social planner’s perspective will never be more than the per 
unit cost of education unless the parameters are no longer fractions but are larger than one or 
negative. For ease of understanding how the parametric relationships work within this optimal 
subsidy specification, the equation can be re-written below as optimal price of education, which 
is the cost of education less the subsidy paid out.  
  (27) 
  
From equation (27), it is easier to see the relationships within. As an example, when the 
aggregate returns to capital, , increases, the social planner should increase the subsidy to 
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internalize the positive effects. This will mean the lowering of the optimal prize of education, 
. This relationship and the others are reflected in the contour plots from Mathematica as 
follows8.  
   
 Figure 9 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus aggregate returns δ after tax internalization 
 
Figure 9 shows the increase in subsidy allocation as aggregate returns to human capital increases. 
The sharp drop at  happens because the estimated parameter for  is 0.1. When 
 , the power of the entire benefits term in (26) or the right hand side term in (27) goes 
to infinity, resulting in the steep drop9. 
                                                
8 The parameter estimates for these contour plots are all multiplied by five to make their effects more visible in the 
plots.   
9 When , the power of the entire benefits term in (26) or the entire right hand side term in (27) becomes 
. This causes the entire term to increase to infinity.  
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 Figure 10 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus education costs after tax internalization 
 
 At first glance, the per unit education cost seems to increase one for one with the 
education subsidy. However, when the plot is enlarged for very high levels of education cost, the 
optimal education subsidy is shown to increase at a much slower rate as seen in the smaller plot 
on the right. Diminishing returns to higher levels of education costs applies with the tapering off 
of the subsidy allocation.   
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Figure 11 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus individual returns γ after tax internalization 
 
The threshold of  that was seen in Figure 8 is confirmed here. The subsidy initially 
decreases with low levels of individual returns but then increases after that10.   
A comparison between the optimal education subsidy as a form of foreign aid or when 
funded by the economy’s tax revenues confirms a number of earlier intuitions. The cost of 
education results in an increase in the optimal education subsidy in both instances. This makes 
intuitive sense because when education costs more the subsidy should increase accordingly 
holding everything else constant. Similarly, higher aggregate returns to human capital will result 
in higher education subsidy allocations. This is because the social planner will have more human 
capital investment benefits to internalize compared to the households. This positive relationship 
is confirmed in both specifications as well. The individual returns to human capital have a more 
dynamic relationship with education subsidy. A threshold of  is confirmed in both 
                                                
10 There is an additional contour plot of the relationship between fertility costs and education subsidy which is 
included in the appendix. It is not part of the main body because the first specification of education subsidy did not 
include the fertility cost parameter.  
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specifications where below it, education subsidy will decrease. However, beyond this value, 
education subsidy monotonically increases with higher individual returns to human capital. Due 
to the omission of the opportunity cost of education externality, I do not have a contour plot 
documenting the relationship between the returns to the parents’ opportunity cost and the 
education subsidy in the second specification. However, if there is a way to simplify the equation 
and find that relationship, it should be no different from when the subsidy is allocated 
exogenously.  
The next section broadly tests the theoretical model for real world implications.  
 
4 Empirical Implications 
4.1 Overview of data 
 Since education subsidies have been employed by many countries over the years, I have 
decided to test the effectiveness of this policy measure. My hypothesis is that countries, 
particularly from the lower income spectrum, are implementing relatively larger subsidies 
compared to developed countries because they realize that households suboptimize in their 
human capital investments. These subsidies, if effective, should cause a relatively larger increase 
in education levels and a relatively bigger decrease in fertility rates in developing countries. I 
will be presenting only my findings for secondary education here since for many developing 
countries the number of years for compulsory education includes primary education but doesn’t 
cover secondary education entirely, if at all. Therefore secondary education levels will be 
responsive to the effects of a subsidy more so than primary education11.  
                                                
11 My findings on primary education have been included in the appendix. 
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I will first use the difference-in-differences method to test the effectiveness of the 
subsidies in terms of affecting a higher human capital level and a lower fertility rate. After that I 
run two regressions to test the magnitude of the subsidy’s effects on human capital and fertility 
in the different countries. Also, I include life expectancy data to capture the old-age support 
motive effect in my model as well as some dummy variables for different income category 
indicators and the implementation fertility control policies.  
 Due to data constraints, I use only years 1980 and 2005 for my analysis instead of a time 
series set. I assume that from 1980, developing countries implement different subsidy measures 
and so in 2005 there should be a significant difference in human capital levels and fertility rates. 
Understandably, this decision will mean that I am not able to distinguish the difference between 
an increase of 10 percent in education levels for a country from 89% to 99% and another from 
40% to 50%. Due to their different starting points, 10% from the former country will mean less 
compared to the latter country in terms of impact. To compensate for this, I differentiate all the 
countries in my dataset by Low Income, Low Middle Income, Upper Middle Income, and High 
Income. This means that the starting levels of these countries will be assumed to be different 
based on the income category they belong to. These countries are ranked according to Gross 
National Income per capita (in US Dollars) using historical data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators in 198712.  
 The data for human capital investment comes from the “International Data on 
Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications” dataset that Barro and Lee put together in 
2000. While most studies measure human capital in terms of years of education completed or 
                                                
12 1987 was used because that is the earliest year I could find and the ranks do not change a significant amount in 
that short time frame.   
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literacy rates, Barro and Lee pioneered the new method of using international test scores, results 
from the international adult literacy survey, and estimates of labor-market outcomes to come up 
with a more effective measure. They call this a measure of “education attained”. In addition to 
that, they take into account the variation in schooling duration across countries while computing 
their education completed measure, and their measure is relative to the population in the 
secondary school age group instead of total population. Since their dataset does not span past 
2000, I take the most recent year of their data, 1999, and assume it to apply to 200513.  
Data for fertility rates, subsidies, and life expectancy come from the World Bank Data 
Resource, specifically the Education Database and the Health Nutrition & Population Database. 
Data spanning 3 years on either sides of 1980 and 2005 will be used if the observation from the 
original year is missing. The fertility rate data represents the number of children that would be 
born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. The indicator chosen to proxy for the 
education subsidy is the public expenditure per student on education in secondary school levels 
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The GDP per capita influence in 
this indicator is removed to take out the effect it has on the subsidy term. . The life expectancy 
variable indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
To get a preliminary sense of the data, a few scatter plots are shown below. The actual 
regressions will be done in differences of these values from 1980 to 2005 but it is easier to 
                                                
13 The gap of six years should not make much of difference because I am looking at a 25 year difference between 
1980 and 2005 in total.  
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compare them now just in terms of levels. A scatter plot showing the difference in secondary 
education attainment versus difference in fertility rates is included in the appendix 
The two graphs below show the relationship between secondary education attained and 
fertility rates in 1980 and in 2005. The negative relationship is pronounced in both years. In 
2005, most UM countries have moved towards the northwest as a result of rising education 
attainment and falling fertility rates. The LM countries have also experienced similar trends and 
have moved up to the general area where the UM countries where in 1980. There is a general 
decrease in fertility rates for all income categories across the years.  
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 Next, subsidy is introduced on the x-axis to show its effects on fertility rates. The 
expected negative relationship can be observed as fertility declines and subsidy increases. This 
southwest trend is led by the H countries and followed by the UM countries in 2005. However 
the LM countries, and especially the L countries, are slower in responding to the trend.  
Figure 9 Year 1980 
 
Figure 10 Year 2005 
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 In terms of education attained versus education subsidy. A positive relationship is 
apparent if both years are compared, again with the H countries leading. The UM countries 
follows the northeast trend in 2005 but again the LM and L countries lag behind.   
Figure 11 Year 1980 
Figure 12 Year 2005 
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 From the scatter plots, it can be deduced that there is a definite negative relationship 
between fertility and secondary education attainment. The education subsidy’s negative effect on 
fertility and positive effect on secondary education attainment tend to be more pronounced in the 
Figure 17 Year 2005 
Figure 16 Year 1980 
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High and Upper Middle income countries with the other lower income countries slowly 
following suit in 2005.   
  
4.2 Difference-in-difference Analysis 
 The difference-in-difference analysis involves finding the effect of the policy treatment 
on a group before the change and after the change, and comparing that with a control group that 
did not get the same treatment. In this case, the control group will be the developed countries in 
the High Income category. This is because most of them have 99% literacy rates and high 
education levels even in 1980. Therefore the rationale is that they have no need for as much 
education subsidy compared to the countries from other income levels. As a result, the group that 
has been exposed to the policy change, be it the Low Income (L), Low Middle Income (LM) or 
Upper Middle Income (UM) group, should have on average a higher secondary education level 
increase or a lower fertility decrease compared to the High Income (H) group. By just taking the 
difference between the groups across the two years, it is assumed that the control group can 
factor out other changes at the time. This is shown in the expression below, 
 (Treatment Group2005-Treatment Group1980) - (Control Group2005-Control Group1980)14   
 The tables below show the average levels of secondary education attained and completed 




                                                
14 Or (Treatment Group2005-Control Group2005) - (Treatment Group1980-Control Group1980)  
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Low  12 3.116667 4.758333 1.641667 1.066667 
Low Middle 21 5.552381 9.395238 3.842857 3.267857 
Upper Middle 10 10.82 15.98 5.16 4.585 
High 16 20.44375 21.01875 0.575   
Table 2 Difference-in-difference Analysis of Secondary Education Completed 
 
From above, the last column shows the estimates. All treatment groups show a positive 
increase in completed secondary education relative to the control group. The biggest increase in 
completed education comes from the UM group while the smallest is from the L group. This is 
intuitive because UM countries have the incentive and the resources to pursue more aggressive 





















Low 12 14.475 19.88333 5.408333 4.502083 
Low Middle 21 19.0619 28.62381 9.561905 8.655655 
Upper Middle 10 26.47 35.87 9.4 8.49375 
High 16 46.4125 47.31875 0.90625   
Table 3 Difference-in-difference Analysis of Secondary Education Attained 
 
 
In Table 3, similar effects that are observed from Table 2 are shown here. However, the 
estimates are greater in magnitude and the LM countries top the UM countries in education 
attainment by a small percentage. This shows that the treatment groups have a larger positive 
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Low 12 6.058967 4.228367 -1.8306 -1.49611 
Low Middle 21 4.775057 2.787363 -1.98769 -1.6532 
Upper Middle 10 3.63566 1.91928 -1.71638 -1.38189 
High 16 2.158531 1.824042 -0.33449   
Table 4 Difference-in-difference Analysis of Fertility Rate 
 
 In terms of fertility rates, all the treatment groups show a decrease in fertility relative to 
the control group. The LM countries have the biggest drop in fertility followed by the L 
countries.  
 It is evident from here that there is a policy effect in the treatment group that is causing a 
rise in completed secondary education and secondary education attainment as well as a drop in 
fertility rates. The next step is to introduce the variables in my regressions to test the significance 
of the subsidy proxy in affecting these changes.  
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 Firstly, to get an accurate education subsidy proxy, the GDP per capita effect has to be 
removed from the original data taken from the World Bank site. As well, the percentages in the 
data have to be removed for ease of comparison. If PuEx is the public expenditure per student as 
a percentage of GDP per capita (as given by the World Bank database), and GDPp is GDP per 
capita, then the subsidy term, sub can be found by 
   
 The table below shows the breakdown of the average education subsidy in the two years. 
The L countries have seen a decrease in average education subsidy while the other countries 
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have seen increases. The average H country student has about 24 times the amount of subsidy an 
average L country student gets in 1980, with the gap widening to about 65 times in 2005. Even 
the average UM country student gets about 10 times less than a H country student in 1980, but 
the gap closes to about 5 times in 2005. The H countries have the highest level of average 
education subsidies as the amount almost doubled from 1980 to 2005. However, the UM 
countries has the largest relative increase where the 1980 average more than doubled in 2005. 
The amount of subsidy increase is still dwarfed by the H countries though. The difference in 




















Low 12 152.385 103.5521 -48.8329 
Low Middle 21 335.076 531.8992 196.8232 
Upper Middle 10 684.2215 1503.65 819.4285 
High 16 3577.149 6759.365 3182.216 
Table 5 Breakdown of education subsidy in 1980 and 2005 
 
 The other independent variable for the regression is difference of life expectancy at birth, 
LEXP_DIFF. The table below shows an increase across all categories for the aged population 







in 1980 (age) 
Life expectancy 




Low 12 52.49174 56.19145 3.699708 
Low Middle 21 63.04605 68.0586 5.012551 
Upper Middle 10 67.80207 75.0124 7.210334 
High 16 74.02969 79.74274 5.713055 
Table 6 Breakdown of aged population ratio in 1980 and 2005 
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 The 16 H countries from the previous section have been excluded in the actual regression 
analysis since I am only concerned with lower income countries in my theoretical model15. In the 
first of two OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the difference in secondary education 
attained LS_DIFF. The dependent variable in the second regression is the difference in fertility 
rates FERT_DIFF. Secondary education attained is chosen as the dependent variable in the first 
regression over secondary education completed because it is a better measure of the human 
capital stock at the secondary education level across countries.  
 Lastly, a number of dummy variables will be included. L and UM represent the different 
income categories of the countries in my dataset. This is so that the individual effects of the 
subsidy of these categories can be seen on the dependent variable. As well, a dummy variable for 
fertility control policies FERT_POL is included to show the 23 countries in my sample that have 
implemented them. The data is taken from the Population Council. The descriptive statistics and 
measure of correlations for the various independent variables are included in the appendix. 
 The regression equation for the difference in secondary education attained is  
 
 
LS_DIFF = β0 + δ0L + δ1UM + β1FERT_DIFF + β2SUB_DIFF + β3LEXP_DIFF  
 
 
 Based on the results of my theoretical model, there should be significant increases in the 
education attainment levels for the income categories L and UM. Life expectancy, LEXP_DIFF, 
should expect to effect a negative change in the education attainment if resources channeled 
towards parents takes away from overall income of the children. FERT_DIFF should have a 
negative correlation with education since they are substitutes in the household’s optimization 
                                                
15 They were included the in the tables above for comparison purposes. 
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problem. Lastly, subsidy, SUB_DIFF16, should have a positive effect on secondary education 
attainment.  
 The regression equation for the difference in fertility rates is 
 
FERT_DIFF = β0 + δ0FERT_POL + δ1L + δ2UM + β1LS_DIFF + β2SUB_DIFF + β3LEXP_DIFF  
 
 I should expect to see the following relationships based on my model. Fertility control 
policies FERT_POL should have a negative effect on fertility. Income categories L and UM 
should be significantly negative towards difference in fertility rates. Life expectancy, 
LEXP_DIFF, should have a negative effect to fertility rates due to the specification of the 
variable. The decrease in child mortality and increase in care of parents due to longer life 
expectancy will decrease overall income of the children. Secondary education attainment 
LS_DIFF should have a negative correlation with fertility rates because of their substitution 
effects with each other. Finally, the education subsidy, SUB_DIFF, should have a negative effect 









                                                
16 I did my initial regression with interaction terms between education subsidy and the different income categories. 
They were all insignificant. Therefore, I have not included them here.  
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4.4 Results  
Below is the first regression result, 
Dependent Variable: LS_DIFF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/28/09   Time: 10:47   
Sample (adjusted): 1 43   
Included observations: 43 after adjustments  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.254888 2.517085 2.882258 0.0065 
L -4.180017 2.192162 -1.906801 0.0643 
UM 0.964594 2.461578 0.391860 0.6974 
FERT_DIFF -2.254130 0.940357 -2.397100 0.0217 
SUB_DIFF 0.001251 0.001488 0.840524 0.4060 
LEXP_DIFF -0.516269 0.124589 -4.143777 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.434645     Mean dependent var 8.365116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.358245     S.D. dependent var 7.395748 
S.E. of regression 5.924704     Akaike info criterion 6.524926 
Sum squared resid 1298.778     Schwarz criterion 6.770675 
Log likelihood -134.2859     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.615551 
F-statistic 5.689110     Durbin-Watson stat 1.916943 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000546    
     
      
Table 7 Regression Results for Difference in Secondary Education Attainment 
 
The L dummy variable is negative and significant while the UM variable has an 
insignificant estimate. This shows that low income countries have a negative effect on the levels 
of secondary education attained. Next, fertility rates have a highly negative relationship with 
secondary education attainment, confirming the implications from the theoretical model.  
Education subsidy has a positive significant impact on secondary education attained also 
confirming the implications from the theoretical model. Life expectancy has an expected 
significantly negative relationship with education attained, showing a diverting of funds away 
from children towards the productive population’s parents in their retirement. This again 
confirms the theoretical model’s intuition. 
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The next set of regression results are as follows, 
Dependent Variable: FERT_DIFF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/28/09   Time: 10:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1 43   
Included observations: 43 after adjustments  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.249334 0.399839 -3.124593 0.0035 
FERT_POL -0.499403 0.320339 -1.558981 0.1277 
L 0.045583 0.369458 0.123377 0.9025 
UM -0.122063 0.424971 -0.287226 0.7756 
LS_DIFF -0.053021 0.024776 -2.139994 0.0392 
SUB_DIFF 0.000456 0.000233 1.962018 0.0575 
LEXP_DIFF -0.017279 0.024096 -0.717066 0.4780 
     
     R-squared 0.254943     Mean dependent var -1.940158 
Adjusted R-squared 0.130767     S.D. dependent var 1.014193 
S.E. of regression 0.945560     Akaike info criterion 2.873821 
Sum squared resid 32.18699     Schwarz criterion 3.160528 
Log likelihood -54.78715     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.979549 
F-statistic 2.053075     Durbin-Watson stat 2.017468 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.083601    
     
      
Table 8 Regression Results for Difference in Fertility Rates 
 
 
From these results, the L and UM countries have a insignificant variables. Secondary 
education attainment is significantly negative with fertility rate, confirming the relationship from 
the first regression. Education subsidy here however affects fertility positively and significantly, 
which is not what was expected. Life expectancy has a negative but insignificant effect on 
fertility. 
The strongest relationship that corresponded with my theoretical model is the negative 
correlation between secondary education attainment and fertility rates. This confirms the 
derivatives from equations (6) and (7) that are negative for both human capital with respect to 
fertility and vice versa. The dummy variables for the income categories are mostly insignificant, 
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reiterating the evidence from the scatter plots that the lower income countries are following the 
lower fertility and higher education trends but at a slower rate. The H countries are the ones 
leading these trends but they are not part of the regressions. The fertility control policies that 
were implemented by the 23 countries are not significant in explaining the variability in fertility 
rates. This might be caused by insufficient information regarding the fertility control policies of 
other countries. 
The life expectancy variable performed as expected in the education regression but not in 
the fertility one. This is because life expectancy is correlated with fertility rates in that how many 
children parents plan to have can depend on how many children they think will survive infancy 
and childhood. This correlation resulted in a lower significance level for life expectancy in the 
fertility regression. However, the old-age support motive is confirmed in the education 
regression.  
SUB_DIFF, the education subsidy proxy performed as expected in the education 
regression but not so in the fertility regression. Upon closer analysis of my choice of a proxy for 
education subsidy and the regression set-up, a number of things became clear.  Initial regressions 
with interaction terms of education subsidy and the different countries’ income categories have 
come up mostly insignificant for both regressions. Therefore they are dropped from the 
regressions here. From the graphs earlier in the empirical section, it is also clear that most of the 
positive relationship with secondary education attainment and negative relationship with fertility 
rates are driven by high income countries. Therefore, I have come to conclude that public 
expenditure on secondary education per student is not a good proxy to measure education 
subsidy. Firstly, this proxy only takes into account public expenditure in education and not the 
private sector investments. Tooley and Dixon (2006) reported on the de facto ‘privatization’ of 
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education due to the poor quality of government-funded schools. Amongst the examples they 
cited are Uganda, Kenya, and India, which are in the dataset. This report then does four case 
studies in four cities in Ghana, Nigeria and India to conclude that even though private schools 
are not part of the solution for satisfying the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), perhaps 
that ruling should be revised if privatization of education is the de facto solution to educating the 
future generation in some countries.  
Furthermore, many creative strategies have been developed to encourage secondary 
education in households, particularly for lower income countries. ‘Meeting the Challenges of 
Secondary Education in Latin America and East Asia’, a book published by the World Bank in 
2006 highlights Latin America and East Asia’s efforts in strengthening their secondary education 
systems. Examples of countries that are also in my dataset include Korea’s public-private 
partnerships to finance its school systems, China’s school self-funding strategies including 
school-run businesses, and Mexico’s conditional cash transfer programs for the poor, contingent 
upon them sending their children to school consistently. Firstly these strategies show that 
education subsidies are not just publicly funded. In fact, these strategies are developed because 
many of the governments of poorer countries cannot afford to pay out these subsidies. Secondly, 
they are highly successful and so is probably the cause for the large positive difference-in-
difference estimates for secondary education in the countries they were implemented in.  
As well, from the theoretical model the total cost of education is . It is the 
education cost minus the education subsidy. In the regression I had the education subsidy proxy. 
However, without a proxy for education cost, it is not possible to know what the net cost is. 
Therefore a better measure will be the net cost of education after taking out the subsidy term 
from education cost. Lastly, the regression did not control for extraordinary circumstances. An 
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example of this is the civil war in Rwanda that was happening during 1980 and 2005. As 
Rwanda’s economy is crippled, this resulted in a huge subsidy drop of about 272 dollars per 
student. The Iran-Iraq war also happened between 1980 and 1988. Their subsidy decreased by 
about 318 dollars per student. These huge dips in subsidies are caused by external circumstances 
but since they were included in the regression they heavily skewed the subsidy variable. I chose 
to not remove them from the dataset because I only had 43 observations to start with. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 In this paper, I develop a theoretical model to show how positive externalities from 
aggregate human capital are not internalized by households in their investment decisions. As a 
result, I show that households over-invest in fertility and under-invest in education for their 
offspring. By showing that the desired human capital investment levels for the social planner is 
higher than the household’s, I am able to specify an optimal education subsidy that will close the 
gap between the two parties. Taking it further, I internalize the cost of providing that subsidy in 
the economy with a payroll tax and was able to detail the resultant subsidy measure. The initial 
parametric relationships all hold in the new subsidy measure. Empirically, the difference-in-
differences analysis shows strong effects of policy implementations resulting in decreased 
fertility rates as well as increased secondary education attainment in the treatment group 
compared to the control groups. The OLS regressions show the substitution effect between 
fertility rates and secondary education attainment from the theoretical model is also confirmed 
here. Life expectancy as a proxy for the old-age support motive reflects partially the family’s 
added financial expense to care for the elderly. Lastly, the subsidy proxy has proven to be 
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inadequate in capturing all the secondary education level increases and fertility rate decreases for 
the reasons given above. 
 There are much opportunity for further work on both the theoretical model and empirical 
specifications. Firstly, the consumption function in the second period could be constructed to be 
more realistic. Bequests can be built in, even if minimal, so that parents are not just financial 
burdens on their children when they are retired. This will make the model more realistic. As 
well, the lagged tax policy can be introduced so that one generation pays out to another instead 
of the incumbent measure. This is so that the same generation is not seeing a net change in 
income and hence the aggregate factors are not affected. It will also make the model more 
realistic. The fraction paid out to parents, θ, can also be endogenized so the productive 
population has a choice in deciding how much to pay out to their parents. Lastly, a fertility 
control measure can be introduced as part of the fertility decisions so that its effect can be 
studied singularly.  
 On the empirical section, a more encompassing subsidy measure can be used. It will have 
to be able to include public expenditure, private investments, and the other funding strategies that 
were mentioned. One possibility is to use a ranking system. This will ensure that all efforts to 
increase human capital investment are taken into account. Secondly, more observations can be 
incorporated to substantiate the findings. The Health, Nutrition, and Population Database as well 
as the Barro and Lee dataset are quite substantial, so that will be possible if the good subsidy 
measure has enough observations as well. A more representative variable on the old age support 
motive should also be found. Rather than just taking the life expectancy, survey data could be 
used to give a better picture of the aged population’s contributions to the household. Also, a 
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measure of the efficiency of different fertility policies, rather than just a dummy variable, will 
help explain the effects of the fertility regression better.  
 Finally, an entirely different alternative to testing the theoretical model that initially 
motivated me to embark on the theoretical model is to look at country-specific data. By focusing 
on just a few countries, individualized parameters for the respective countries that are dynamic 
can be estimated and an optimal subsidy level can be determined. This can be compared to their 
current initiatives in subsidies and their effectiveness can then be measured. This will require 
more micro-data on these chosen countries but it can be an effective way of testing the validity 
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Figure 138 Social planner’s higher steady state (SS) HC: Inequality feasibility plot for γ versus ε 
 
 
Figure 19 Social planner’s lower steady state (SS) Fertility: Inequality feasibility plot for γ versus δ 
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Figure 21 Household and social planner’s steady state fertility investment 
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Figure 22 Contour plot of education subsidy s versus opportunity cost  after tax internalization 
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 FERT_DIFF LEXP_DIFF LS_DIFF SUB_DIFF 
 Mean -1.940158  5.157289  8.365116  273.0599 
 Median -1.716000  6.380000  6.900000  59.76796 
 Maximum -0.590000  14.78873  32.40000  2811.672 
 Minimum -4.578000 -17.34010 -2.400000 -532.5584 
 Std. Dev.  1.014193  7.463565  7.395748  710.5654 
 Skewness -0.945348 -1.390678  1.113529  2.417271 
 Kurtosis  3.528671  4.384861  4.417174  8.595175 
     
 Jarque-Bera  6.905482  17.29636  12.48463  97.96614 
 Probability  0.031659  0.000175  0.001945  0.000000 
     
 Sum -83.42678  221.7634  359.7000  11741.58 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  43.20071  2339.602  2297.278  21205936 
     
 Observations  43  43  43  43 
Figure 14 Descriptive statistics for independent variables in regression 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary       
Date: 04/28/09   Time: 10:41       
Sample (adjusted): 1 43       
Included observations: 43 after adjustments      
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)     
         
         Correlation FERT_DIFF  FERT_POL  L  LEXP_DIFF  LM  LS_DIFF  SUB_DIFF  UM  
FERT_DIFF  1.000000        
FERT_POL  -0.263730 1.000000       
L  0.018937 0.164384 1.000000      
LEXP_DIFF  0.078634 0.021814 -0.122944 1.000000     
LM  -0.119023 0.164859 -0.607866 -0.019171 1.000000    
LS_DIFF  -0.317154 0.048495 -0.251685 -0.493681 0.159972 1.000000   
SUB_DIFF  0.258366 -0.050233 -0.285185 0.096095 -0.106064 0.087297 1.000000  
UM  0.120724 -0.369595 -0.342494 0.153216 -0.537825 0.077940 0.428286 1.000000 
         
         Figure 24 Correlation table between regressors 
 
 
